Domestic issues tend to top Philippine voters’ concerns, but recent events could make Ferdinand Marcos’ foreign policy a decisive factor.

Instead of aligning with one superpower against another, the Philippines is bent on enhancing its own strategic agency in world affairs.

Whether Trump or Harris wins, Biden’s departure will mark the end of an era of distinctly multilateral American leadership

Calls in the Philippines are growing, for measures from building a lighthouse on Second Thomas Shoal to inundating China with litigation.

Dithering official statements reflect not only Philippine fears of unwanted escalation but also, crucially, doubts over US defence commitments.

Divisions are undermining Asean centrality as nations from Malaysia to the Philippines disagree on the China threat and nurture different priorities.

China should rethink its approach to the Philippines in favour of de-escalation and genuinely mutually beneficial agreements. Meanwhile, the Philippines should maintain robust communication with China, avoid getting dragged into a US-led ‘Asian Nato’ and engage with Asean for stability.

Europe is taking great pains in its efforts to secure global influence to side with neither the US or China while pursuing ties with the rest of Asia. Economic, strategic and diplomatic interests mean Europe has a strong desire to have a say in ensuring a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

In dialling back the possibility of more US bases and dialling up a commitment to diplomacy with China, Marcos is offering a path to de-escalation. In turn, Beijing could rein in its aggressive tactics in the South China Sea and explore genuine economic cooperation.

Japan, the Philippines and the US will hold a historic summit this month to deepen military cooperation amid China’s resurgence as naval power. With increased tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea, the trilateral security arrangement is likely to reinforce zero-sum geopolitics in Asia.

Under Olaf Scholz, Germany has moved away from a passive “change through trade” approach to take a more active role in global affairs. Few countries are better-positioned than Germany to promote a constructive, collaborative global order against the backdrop of intensifying superpower rivalry.

The recent Australia-Asean summit in Melbourne was illuminating in areas of economic cooperation as well as hot-button geopolitical issues. Agreeing on greater trade and investment was easy, but the South China Sea and Israel’s war in Gaza showed the wide diversity in opinion among attendees.

Faced with economic woes and geopolitical uncertainties that have left it increasingly squeezed between a resurgent China and an unpredictable ally in America, Japan needs a grand new strategy.

The Biden administration faces an increasingly impossible task in the Middle East as it comes under pressure to pursue contradictory goals over the Israeli-Gaza war. This bodes ill for progress in the region but could herald a period of strategic sobriety and stability between the US and China.

Assertiveness from the political and defence establishment is understandable after previous passivity but risks adding fuel to fire, particularly in the South China Sea. Manila must diplomatically manage disputes.

Despite a similar outlook on maritime disputes with China and past cooperation, a US-wary Vietnam, increasingly dependent on China, is likely to resist any fully fledged alliance with the Philippines.

Rising Philippine-China tensions over disputes related to the South China Sea have coincided with deteriorating relations between Beijing and Washington. Elections next year in Taiwan and the US could further inflame tensions in the region. There is an urgent need for compromise on high-stakes issues.

Vietnam has quickly become the new darling of a West seeking regional friends and allies to curb China’s rise. However, Hanoi’s China-friendly foreign policy turn shows it knows how much it needs Beijing to prosper and forge a new global order.

Fumio Kishida has steered Japan away from its traditional focus on development-centred foreign policy, initiating a new security assistance scheme. While a more assertive Japan might be welcome in Southeast Asia, the package is still modest and the potential risks will limit Tokyo’s chances of success.

Despite the welcome re-establishment of communication channels between China and the US, there are still reasons to manage expectations. The prospect of more anti-China rhetoric leading up to next year’s US elections, muddled US policy in Asia and security tensions must be taken into account.

Given its commitment in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, it is unclear how the United States can also sustain its rivalry with China. Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea, frontline treaty allies such as the Philippines have grounds to worry about how “ironclad” the relationship is.

China’s refusal to condemn Hamas and stated neutrality have won it diplomatic points across the Muslim world and raised its standing in the Middle East. This has positioned China to advocate for peace in a turbulent region.

Relations between Beijing and Manila keep getting worse as neither side is backing off its maritime claims or military activities in the South China Sea. While taking a tough stance abroad might yield political dividends at home, both sides urgently need to find a way to peacefully coexist.

Scepticism aside, both Vietnam and India prefer a world dominated by neither the US nor China. They are interested in Western technology and investment but neither wishes to, nor can afford to, confront Beijing.

The Indonesian president seems determined to contain multiple crises in Southeast Asia as well as head off a clash among rival powers in the Indo-Pacific. His cautious approach risks inaction that further deepens regional crises, but it also holds the promise of building a more capable, coherent Asean.

Recognising that traditional, highly centralised military alliances like Nato might not be the best fit today, the US has turned to minilateral security arrangements. However, in countering China, Washington’s ‘integrated deterrence’ strategy has three weaknesses.

Filipino presidents have tried to improve ties with China throughout the 20th century, but domestic scandals and territorial disputes have got in the way. Clashes between Filipino and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea have renewed public anger towards Beijing, making diplomatic efforts politically risky.

Far from a routine exchange of diplomatic niceties, recent developments in EU-Philippine strategic relations reflect a broader geopolitical trend in Asean amid US-China jostling.

Marcos Jnr’s pivot towards the US is dividing his coalition government even as the EDCA defence pact with Washington draws Beijing’s ire. In his second year of office, managing China and US defence ties will be doubly crucial.

A series of high-level meetings and positive rhetoric meant Yellen’s visit was encouraging to many, but the underpinnings of US-China tensions remain. Leaders on both sides will have to expend significant political capital for a desperately needed diplomatic breakthrough in the near future.